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Several EU countries use a closed list system to elect their members of the European Parliament.
But what determines the position where a candidate is placed on these lists? Based on a recent
study, Elena Frech writes that parties tend to prioritise MEPs who have previously been part of
powerful committees in the European Parliament, but that candidates also need to maintain close
links with the party organisation to receive a favourable position on the list.
Many citizens all over Europe view the European Union as undemocratic, lacking in transparency,
and distant from voters. Indeed, two out of three Europeans think that their voice does not count in
the European Union. Many reasons for this so called ‘democratic deﬁcit’ have been identiﬁed; however, developing
an understanding of the most direct democratic link between voters and the EU – European Parliament elections –
 is undoubtedly one of the key steps in reaching a solution.
Over 60 per cent of European citizens cannot vote for
a speciﬁc candidate in European elections. Instead,
voters in countries with closed list proportional
representation electoral systems are only allowed to
choose a national party. By deciding the list
placement of candidates, national parties in closed
list systems eﬀectively determine who is elected. If a
national party places a speciﬁc candidate in a very
low list position, the candidate has no chance of
being elected.
In contrast, as proportional representation candidates
are elected starting from the ﬁrst candidate on the list
and continuing downward, the ﬁrst list position of
larger parties is usually very safe. Given that voters
have a very limited inﬂuence on who is elected in
closed list electoral systems, it is unsurprising that in
these systems about 5 per cent more citizens, on average, believe that their voice does not count in the European
Union. Voters in countries that allow for speciﬁc candidates to be chosen are (on average) more likely to feel that
their vote in European elections counts.
Explaining German candidate selection in European elections
National parties therefore have enormous selection power in European elections in several countries. However, we
know relatively little about how they select their candidates and why. In a recent study, I use Germany as an
example to analyse which factors determine the list placement of incumbent parliamentarians standing for re-
election.
I propose national parties pursue three diﬀerent goals when selecting candidates. First, they want legislative
leverage: the power or potential to inﬂuence policies. Second, national parties value loyalty. Third, parties want to
maximise votes by selecting popular candidates who can increase the number of their party members in the
Parliament.
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My results show that German parties tend to place European parliamentarians who have been members of more
powerful EP committees – for example the committee dealing with economic and monetary aﬀairs – on better, more
promising list positions than candidates who have been only part of a less powerful committee – for instance the
committee on women’s rights and gender equality. Surprisingly, my study yields no convincing eﬀect of factors
related to the other two goals – loyalty and attractiveness to voters – on the list placement of incumbent European
parliamentarians.
This is not to say that German national parties ﬁnd these goals unimportant. Measurement problems or a European
Parliament that is simply too distant from Germany for parties to observe how loyal their MEPs really are could
explain these results (please see the accompanying paper for further discussion on this topic).
Contact with the national party counts
Maintaining contact with a national party also counts a great deal for candidate selection. The experience of
Friedrich-Wilhelm Graefe zu Baringdorf illustrates this point. He had represented the German Green party in the
European Parliament for 25 years when the party decided not to re-select him for the 2009 European elections.
Some party delegates explained their decision by stating that he had ‘lifted oﬀ’, no longer showed his face in the
party’s sub-district organisation, and had taken to campaigning exclusively for a farmers’ lobbying group that he was
the President of.
German members of the EP are well advised to stay in close contact with their local party leadership if they want to
be re-elected. Analyses of party statutes and interviews with German party leaderships have shown why this is the
case: partially due to the federal structure of Germany, candidate selection of national parties is relatively de-
centralised.
German parties either construct 16 diﬀerent electoral lists for European elections, one in each state (this is the case
in the CDU/CSU), or have one federal electoral list. In both systems, candidates are usually selected at the local or
sub-district level and need to win recognition at the district and state level. Due to this distinct pre-selection process,
local and regional party leaderships are relatively powerful in proposing and selecting candidates for the European
elections.
Being a member of a national party executive (while serving as an MEP) provides an important means of staying in
contact with party members who make selection decisions. National party oﬃces also help to inﬂuence (informal)
pre-selection. Nearly one in two of the German MEPs elected between 1999 and 2009 had an advantage in getting
re-elected because they were part of a party’s leadership (in the local, sub-district, district, state, or federal party
organisation) during their mandate.
Informal pre-selection and excessive informal bargaining before a party conference may lead to a situation where it
is clear who will run on which list position. Analyses show that German incumbent parliamentarians get lower list
positions when running for re-election to the EP if the intensity of competition for promising list positions is high at a
party conference (this means that informal bargaining beforehand was probably less pronounced). A possible
explanation for this phenomenon is the incumbents’ advantage in informal pre-selection processes.
Please read our comments policy before commenting .
Note: For more information, see the author’s recent publication in European Union Politics, which is based on a
dissertation pursued at the University of Mannheim. This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of
EUROPP – European Politics and Policy, nor of the London School of Economics.
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